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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND ARTICLE III:
A JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO ERIE
The courts of a federal government, like all courts, are instruments for
securing justice; but unlike other courts, they are also instruments for mak-
ing major adjustments in the relationship between states and the nation.1 In
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 2 the United States Supreme Court made an historic
adjustment in this relationship by denying the existence of a general federal
common law and by overruling Swift v. Tyson,3 the case often cited as the
source of such law. The Court also required federal courts to follow the com-
mon law, as well as the statutory law, of the states in which they sat. Despite
the importance of this adjustment there remains a controversy as to its basis:
does the Constitution limit the substantive power of federal courts to make
common law; or is there no such limitation, the decision being based only
upon statutory interpretation or a policy against forum shopping?4 The Court
in Erie declared that "the unconstitutionality of the course [previously] pur-
sued" compelled the decision,6 but this statement has been described as dictum a
and, it appears that the Court has rarely referred to the constitutional nature
of the case in the years following the decisionY In a recent article Judge
Friendly defended the view that Erie rests upon constitutional grounds,8 and
drew from a survey of the subsequent cases the following conclusion:
The complementary concepts - that federal courts must follow state
decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the
states whereas state courts must follow decisions on subjects within
the national legislative power where Congress has so directed - seem
so beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why
a century and a half were needed to discover them, and we must wonder
1. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power betwea United States and State
Courts, 13 CoaNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
4. As an illustration of this controversy compare 1A MooRE, FEDFML PRAcricE
0.304 at 3050 (2d ed. 1961) ("it is unsound to make the Erie doctrine a rule of constitu-
tional limitation") with Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 383,'384-98 (1964) ("the constitutional ground taken in Erie
was ... the only tenable one. . ." id. at 386).
5. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
6. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946). Cf. Corbin, The Common Law of the United
States, 47 YAE LJ. 1351, 1353 (1938).
7. Clark, supra note 6, at 278. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 1gs (1956),
presents one of the few.references by the Supreme Court to the constitutional issue in
the Erie decision. And in this case the Court narrowly construed a statute to avoid that
issue. Id. at 202.
8. Friendly, supra note 4, at 384-98.
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even more why anyone should want to shy away once the discovery
was made.9
Shortly after Judge Friendly wrote this article the Supreme Court handed
down the decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,0 a case which
does not seem to comport with the "beautifully simple" system Judge Friendly
described and which has been read by at least one commentator as an indication
that the Court's attitude toward Erie may be undergoing a basic change.,'
The impact of Sabbatino in the context of continuing uncertainty about the
foundation of Erie calls for a further inquiry into the relationship of federal
common law to the Constitution.
The plaintiff in Sabbatino, a Cuban government agency suing in federal
court, claimed title to a shipment of sugar previously nationalized by Cuba
and asked that effect be given to that nationalization. In holding for plaintiff,
the Court applied the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.' 2
Relying on its own interpretation of the doctrine, the Court refused to con-
sider itself bound by Erie to follow the doctrine as applied by the courts
of New York, the state in which the case arose."' Such a reference to state
law was held unnecessary since it seemed "fair to assume that the Court did
not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins."14 Instead the Court felt:
. . . constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members
of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect
of federal law. 5
While this statement refers to the act of state doctrine, it implies that all
questions of foreign relations law are issues of federal common law.' 0 Although
9. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
10. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Friendly was aware of this decision but did not incorporate
it into his article. Friendly, supra note 4, at 408 n.119.
11. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbalino, 64 COLUM.
L. R v..805 (1964).
12. 376 U.S. at 416, quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
13. The Court recognized that the conclusion in the case might have been the same
even if a reference to state law were required, since the courts of the state in which
the case arose had previously enunciated the act of state doctrine. 376 U.S. at 425.
14. Id. at 425.
15. Ibid.
16. Professor Henldn views the possible implications of Sabbatino as extending beyond
foreign relations law, but he suggests other factors which may limit the effect of the
decision to this area of law. Henldn, supra note 11, at 817-19. See also, Friendly, mspra
note 4, at 408 n.119, viewing Sabbatino as fashioning a federal law of foreign relations.
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it had long been urged that federal courts should fashion foreign relations
law without reference to state law,'7 it was not until Sabbatino that this was
done.' 8
Foreign relations law is not the first area in which the Supreme Court has
declared Erie inapplicable. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co.,:9 decided the same day as Erie, the Court held that an interstate
stream must be apportioned between two states according to federal common
law. In the following years federal common law was held to govern other
cases such as those concerning federal government checks, o labor-management
relations,21 and admiralty 22 These cases fall into three general categories. First,
in cases concerning federal statutes,23 federal common law guards the interest
derived from the statute :24 in some cases the federal common law is a form of
statutory construction,25 and in others an implementation of a legislative
scheme.28 Second, in cases involving disputes between states, an independent
federal common law is applied since it is thought inappropriate that the law of
either state should govern.27 Third, in cases of admiralty, federal common law is
created to effectuate the intent of the grant of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction in Article III - the creation of uniform admiralty law. The previous
17. See, e.g., Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompk.ins Applied to Inter-
national Law, 33 Ai. J. INe'L L. 740 (1939). Cf. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 331-32 (1937) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942), indicating complete
federal supremacy over the states in the field of foreign relations.
18. See remarks of Rudolph Schlessinger in INmRNATIo AAL LAw nr NATio.NA.. CounTs
107 (Third Cornell Summer Conference on Int'l Law 1960) for statement reflecting
pre-Sabbatino uncertainty as to whether a federal court would be required by Erie to
apply the state version of the act of state doctrine. See also Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F2d
360 (2d Cir. 1948) (state court's interpretation of international law binding on a federal
court deciding a diversity case).
19. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
20. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
21. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
22. Garrett v. Moore-McCormick Co., 317 US. 239 (1942). See also Stevens, Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L RLa. 246 (1950),
for a discussion of the impact of Erie upon admiralty law.
For a collection of cases which have departed from the rule of Erie, see Friendly,
supra note 4, at 408-16; Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1960).
23. Included within this category would be cases involving treaties. See, e.g., Board
of Conm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939).
24. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
25. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 318 U.S. 363 (1943), is an e-xample of
this use of federal common law. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964).
26. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), represents the use of
federal common law to carry out a legislative scheme. See Id. at 456-57.
27. Hendn, .supra note 11, at 817.
28. Jurisdiction over admiralty was given to the federal courts by the Constitution
in order that uniformity of admiralty law could be attained. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 215, 217 (1917). This jurisdictional grant gives federal courts the right
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qualifications of Erie, so characterized, indicate that the decision in Sabbatino
not to apply state law is an important new development in federal common
law.2 0 There was no statutory issue in the case nor any indication from Con-
gress that the Court should make federal law. 80 And, of course, the case in-
volved neither disputes between states nor admiralty law.8'
The Court justified its creation of a new exception to Erie by referring to
various statutory and constitutional provisions reflecting "a concern for uni-
formity in this country's dealings with foreign nations .... ,132 While these
provisions evidence a federal interest in foreign affairs, the Court did not
consider them to require the application of the act of state doctrine. 3 The
making of federal common law based upon such provisions evidencing a fed-
eral interest allows the Court to go beyond the previous exceptions to Erie;
neither a statement of congressional policy - as in cases involving statutes -
nor an express grant of Article III jurisdiction - as in admiralty or disputes
between states - is required to justify this creation of law. 84 Although this
to make admiralty law. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
360-61 (1959). Without this power to make law it would be impossible for the Supreme
Court to impose a uniform law.
29. Prof. Henkin states: "For the first time the Court [in Sabbatlino] . . . concludes
that federal courts may make common law without authorization from Congress." Henkhn,
supra note 11, at 815. However, he acknowledges that federal common law could be made
in disputes between states and in admiralty. Id. at 816 n.34. Thus, Henkin's categorization
of the pre-Sabbatino exceptions to Erie is the same as ours.
It has been suggested that cases in which the United States is a party constitute
another exception to Erie. Kurland, supra note 22, at 828; and Note, Exceptions to Eric
v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HAtv. L. REv. 966, 969-70 (1946).
However, this is only a subcategory of cases involving statutes, for when the federal
government sues a private litigant its rights will be ultimately grounded in a statute. See,
e.g., ibid, which treats Clearleld as such an exception, and compare the Court's view of
Clearfield expressed in Sabbatino - the rights involved in Clearfield being ultimately
grounded in a federal statute. 376 U.S. at 426.
30. Henkin, supra note 11, at 814-15. Since Congress did not direct the Court to
make law, Sabbatino does not fit into Friendly's system. See quote accompanying note
9 supra. Moreover, his system failed to account for the other situations in which federal
courts had fashioned an independent law without prior congressional action - admiralty
and disputes between states.
31. Although Sabbatino does not fall within one of the three previous exceptions to
Erie, it is not the first case in which the Court has refused to follow state law because
of the existence of a "federal interest" not dependent upon federal statutory or constitu-
tional provisions. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538
(1958), where a "strong federal policy" dictated against following the state rule, although
the policy was not required by the Constitution or a federal statute. Cf. United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (dictum) ; United States v. 93.970 Acres, 360
U.S. 328, 332-33 (1959).
32. 376 U.S. 398, at 427 n25.
33. As the Court makes clear: "The text of the Constitution does not require the
act of state doctrine ... ." Id at 423.
34. This basis is similar to that used by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Wheeldin
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653-67 (1963). He suggested that federal courts could make
federal common law concerning the rights, duties, and immunities of federal officers
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theory of federal common law seemingly invites further departures from Eric,
it is difficult to determine its actual impact upon that case since the Court did
not adequately explore the relationship of the theory to the principles under-
lying Erie. The theory used in Sabbatino may thus justify the concern ex-
pressed for the vitality of the rule of Erie.3 5
An analysis of the jurisdictional implications of Sabbatino, however, clarifies
the principles of Erie and illustrates that the theory of Sabbatio conforms to
these principles. These jurisdictional implications derive from the fact that
in Sabbatino the Court indicated it would impose the act of state doctrine
upon state courts. 6 Such imposition of the act of state doctrine reveals that
the Court still adheres to a major policy of Erie. This policy, that all courts,
federal and state, sitting in the same jurisdiction apply the same law, was
designed to prevent forum shopping - the selection of the forum, federal
or state, offering the most favorable substantive law.T While the Court in
Erie implemented the policy against forum shopping by requiring federal
courts to follow state common law, 38 another means might have been possible.
Federal common law could have been imposed upon state courts.sO However,
since the general federal common law promulgated under Swift had never
been imposed upon the states,.40 it was unlikely that the Court considered
this alternative. In Sabbatino, on the other hand, the Court followed the pat-
tern of the other exceptions to Erie by indicating that it would impose the
federal rule upon the states.41
because these were governed by "a matrix of federal statutory and constitutional prin-
ciples." Id. at 665-66. Thus, a theory of federal common law which allows it to be made
upon such a basis might be called a "matrix theory'
35. See Henldn, mpra note 11. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378-79
(1893), utilized a similar theory to justify a federal court's reference to "general law"
instead of state law when deciding a case involving an accident on an interstate railroad.
Baugh was the very case which the plaintiff relied upon in Eric to compel reference to
the general law and which the Erie Court refused to follow. 304 U.S. at 68. Thus, the
use of this theory in Sabbatino to justify an independent federal law appears to be an
added ground for concern about the Erie doctrine.
36. See 376 U.S. at 425 n.23:
We need not now consider whether a state court might, in certain circumstances,
adhere to a more restrictive view concerning the scope of examination of foreign
acts than that required by this Court.
The only implication reasonably drawn from this is that the Court did consider and
decide that a state court might not adopt a less restrictive view - i.e., that it must follow
the Sabbatino act of state doctrine as a minimum. Cf. Henkin, supra note 11, at 806.
37. For the view that Erie was based upon policy rather than "juristic symmetry,"
see Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson. 47 Y~r. L.J. 1336, 1346 (1938).
38. Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins, supra note 29, at 966.
39. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STrA. L REv. 1, 32 (1963).
Cf. Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins, supra note 29, at 974-75.
40. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 773 (1941). Cf. Frank-
furter, supra note 1, at 529 n.150 for a collection of cases in which state courts refused
to follow Swift.
41. The quote from Friendly (text accompanying note 9 supra) illustrates the pattern
of imposing exceptions of Erie upon state courts. The state courts' attitudes toward
1964]
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. Since an imposition of federal law can be enforced only by reversing a
state-decision which fails to- comply with it,4 the imposition in Sabbatino im-
plied that the Supreme Court believed it had jurisdiction of cases in which
state courts refuse to apply the act of state doctrine.43 If this jurisdiction in
fact exists, it must be found ultimately in the clause of Article III which
states that:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority. . . 4
moreover, the Court must have believed that the act of state doctrine arose
under the "laws of the United States." There was clearly no treaty involved
in the case.4r And the doctrine did not arise under the Constitution 40 despite
the fact that it had- become a matter of federal common law and might be
considered supreme by virtue of Article. VI section 2.47 The declaration of
Oetlen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 -(1918), a case which employed the act of
state doctrine but did not impose it upon: the states, are illustrative of what would prob-
ably, have been the reaction of state courts to Sabbatlino had it not imposed the doctrine
upon the states: Monte Blanco Real Estate Corp. v. Wolvin Line, 147 La. 536, 566, 85
So. 242, 243 '(1920); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 223-24, 186
N.E. 679, 681 (1933). But cf. Companie Minera v. Bartlesville Zinc Co., 115 Tex. 21,
30-31, 275 S.W. 388, 391 (1925).
42. Cf:Frilendly, supra note 4, at 411.
43. See CORNELL CONFERENCE, op. cit. -upra note 18, at 84-85, for a description of a
hypothetical case in which a state court refused to apply the act of state doctrine and
thereby vexed the State Department,
- 44. This is the only clause in Article III to which reference is made in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257. Section 1257 is the only statute which allows Supreme Court review of state
court decisions. ROBERTSON- & KIRlXHIAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUP.REmE COURT § 3 (Wolf-
son & Kurland ed. 1951). Therefore, this can be the only clause of Article III to which
reference-may be made by the Court in determining the basis of its constitutional juris-
diction, since such jurisdiction may be utilized only if provided for by statute. Wlscart
v; D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 326 (1796); Ex parle McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 wall,)
506 (1868); .RoamRsoN & IRKIIAm, op. cit. stpra, at § 1. But cf. Merry, Scope of the
Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. Rv. 53 (1962)
(exception and regulation power of Congress relates only to issues of fact and not law) ;
1 CROSSXEY, PoLrrcs AND THE CONsTITUTION 618 (1953) (exception and regulation
power of Congress relates only to the allocation of cases within the federal court system,
not to removal of cases from the system).
45.. If an expression by the- State Department, reflecting the national will as to the
act of state doctrine, could be considered a "treaty," then there would be a "treaty" issue
in the case. See JAF E, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELAO Tio 60-61 (1933).
• 46. The Court states expressly that "[t]he text of the Constitution does not 'equire
the act of state doctrine ... " 376 U.S. at 423.
47. The Court seems to have accepted, by implication, the proposition that federal
common, law is supreme by virtue of Article VI. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co,, 375
U.S. 731, 738-39 (19"61). But compare Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUm. L. Rxv. 489, 500 (1954) '(supremacy clause limited to laws passed by
Congress); Henkin, supra note 11, at 816 & n34 (question whether supremacy clause
extends to federal common law not founded in statutes or the Constitution).
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Article VI that a given rule of law is supreme could not, without more, render
a case involving the rule one arising under the Constitution. If all cases
involving rules embraced by the supremacy clause were cognizable as cases
arising under the Constitution, the other categories of the "arising under"
clause of Article III - laws and treaties - would be superfluous.4 8 Since
no statutory issue was involved in the decision, the Court in suggesting it
would have jurisdiction based upon the "laws of the United States," must
have rejected the traditional theory that "laws" in Article III relates only
to statutes.&4 9 Instead, the Court apparently accepted the view, stated in Justice
Brennan's dissent in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,c0 that
the term "laws" comprehends federal common law, as well as federal statutes.6'
While the Court may hAve previously accepted this proposition,62 Sabbatino
males this acceptance more apparent.
The Court's understanding of "laws" as including federal common law,
as well as statutes, is supported by ample evidence.5m In the latter part of the
eighteenth century "everyone understood decisional principles to be qaws' ;"5
48. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 841, 845 (1st Cir. 1952), took the position that
a claim under federal admiralty law was one arising under the Constitution. Not only
does this position encounter the objection raised above, but it also elevates the duty
to comply with the law of admiralty to a constitutional duty - an unrealistically high level.
Note, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime Claims, 66 HAnv. L
:Rv. 315, 325 (1952). And see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 393 (1959) (dissent), where it was contended that cases of admiralty were cognizable
by federal courts as cases arising under the laws of the United States. Although the
four dissenting Justices were aware of the Doucette case, id. at 388, and agreed with its
result, only two chose to follow its rationale.
49. Friendly, supra note 4, at 393-94; HART & WECiSLR, THE FEnEAL ConMrs A1
THE FEmzaAL SYSTEM 19 (1953) (the change in Article III from 'qaws passed by the
legislature of the United States" to "laws of the United States" was only a change in
wording). This traditional theory allows for the imposition of most post-Erie federal
common law - that which is based upon statutes.
50. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
51. Id. at 393. Although the dissent discussed the term "laws" as used in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, this discussion is relevant to the use of "laws" in Article III, since it vas recog-
nized that the language of the statute vw'as derived from Article III. Id. at 393 n-. See
also Forrester," The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TVn. L. REV. 367, 374-75 (1942),
for historical evidence that § 1331 was derived from Article III.
52. The Court's opinion in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), written by
Justice Douglas, one of the dissenters in Romero who there accepted the vie, that "lavs
of the United States" included federal common law, did not dispute the contention of the
dissenters that "laws" includes federal common law (id. at 664-65) but rather refused to
create the federal common law upon which jurisdiction could be based. But cf. Fitzgerald
v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 17 n.3 (1963).
53. One basis for this understanding is the Constitution's reliance upon common law
definitions. Brant, Mr. Crosskey and tMr. Madison, 54 COLum L. REv. 443, 444 (1954).
54. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
R v. 383, 389- (1964). Professor Crosskey cites as a familiar example of this Blackstone's
Com ._ Axps:oN THE LAws OF ENGLAID. I CRossnEY, Pourics Ahn TaE Cox.s'rruTioN
633 (1953).
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and early congressional legislation reflected this understanding. In section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 r reference is made in the first clause to "statutes"
of the United States, in the second to "a statute of any State" and to "laws"
of the United States, and in the third to "statutes" of the United States. If
the framers of section 25 had considered "laws" and "statutes" to be synony-
mous, they would surely have used either the term "laws" or "statutes" consis-
tently throughout the section. And in section 34 16 of the same act, the phrase
"laws of the several states" was apparently intended to comprehend both sta-
tutes and common law. 7 Additional support for an interpretation of "laws" as
including federal common law is found in the history of the drafting of Article
III. The "arising under" clause originally read, "arising under laws passed
by the legislature of the United States," 8 but the phrase "passed by the legis-
lature" was omitted when Article III was adopted.59
While it seems reasonable to conclude from this evidence that the framers
intended the word "laws" to include common law, it is unclear whether their
reference was to all common law, only a limited area of common law, all
common law which federal courts would have the power to make, c or only
a limited part of such federal common law. If the framer's reference was to all
common law and was, therefore, not limited, federal judges would be free to
create law in any case regardless of the issues involved. The very act of cre-
ating law would simultaneously vest the court with jurisdiction since the newly
created law would arise under "the laws of the United States." Under this
view of "laws" the only limit to federal jurisdiction would be the self-restraint
exercised by federal courts. But the Constitution did not leave the scope of
federal jurisdiction to the discretion of federal judges; Article III prescribes
the limits of the federal judicial system.61 Therefore, "laws" could not refer
to all common law. Nor could the framers have intended "laws" to refer only
to certain of the classes of the common law which federal courts might make.
If this were the intent of the framers, they must have conceived of a bifurcated
system of federal common law in which some classes of laws could be the
55. 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789).
56. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
57. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938); Warren, New' Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 81-88 (1923). But cf.
Kurland, supra note 22, at 832-33.
58. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787 186 (1937).
59. From this omission Justice Brennan seems to have drawn the conclusion that
"laws" was broadened to include common law. Romero v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 n.5 (1959) (dissent). There is little history to illuminate the
framers' intent in making this omission. It is unexplained in Madison's notes, CRossim ,
op. cit. supra note 54, at 621.
60. Assuming arguendo that the law which federal courts have the power to make
is less than all common law.
61. ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, Op. cit. supra note 44, at § 1 and especially n.4, A few
commentators have doubted that Article III prescribes limits to federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., CRossKEY, op. cit. supra note 54, at 618-20.
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basis of jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause and other classes could
not. Not only does an intent to create this bifurcated system seem unlikely,
but also there is no evidence in the constitutional history to support this
theory.62 Two alternatives remain: the framers intended "laws" to refer either
to a limited area of common law or to all common law which a federal court
would have the power to make. A brief analysis demonstrates that these al-
ternatives are in fact coextensive. If federal courts were given jurisdiction
only over a limited area of common law, the framers must have contemplated
that the courts would have the substantive power to make law in that area.co
This area of common law, moreover, would be the only one in which federal
courts would have the power to make common law. A contrary view, allowing
the creation of common law beyond the jurisdictional limits of the "arising
under" clause, would again require the adoption of the bifurcated system -
a highly implausible result. This reasoning demonstrates that the jurisdictional
grant over cases involving federal common law and the substantive power of
federal courts to make that law should be viewed as coextensive. Therefore,
the discovery of the limited area of common law referred to by the framers
in the phrase "laws of the United States" would also delineate the substantive
power of federal courts to make law, i.e., all common law which a federal
court has power to make.
Professor Crosskey has concluded from his extensive research that the
limited reference for "laws" was the common law of England."4 He maintains
that this law was generally regarded as the law of the civilized world and
furnished the area of common law to which the framers referred in Article
III. Professor Crosskey's conclusion has, however, been widely assailed. First,
this theory would render the remaining jurisdictional grants of Article IMI
practically meaningless, for almost every case would arise under "the laws
62. Under such a bifurcated system of federal common law, the Supreme Court
would not have jurisdiction to impose upon state courts some of the law which it could
create. Thus, in these areas state and federal lav would differ, allowing parties to forum
shop. Since both Erie and Sabbalino express an anti-forum shopping policy, it is doubtful
the Court would accept this bifurcated system unless it were supported by compelling
historical evidence. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
63. A grant of federal jurisdiction over an area of law (as opposed to controversies
between specified parties) in which federal courts lacked the power to make common law
would seem unreasonable. Jurisdiction wras given over specific areas of law in order
that such law could be made uniform. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
215, 217 (1917) (admiralty jurisdiction granted in order that a uniform maritime law
might be created). To make that law uniform, the Supreme Court must hmve the power
to create it. Moreover, the grant by the Constitution of jurisdiction over a specific area
of common law has been found to be the justification for federal courts to make law
in that area. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61
(1959) (admiralty).
64. CRossxuy, op. cit. supra note 54, 'at 621-25. He qualified this by stating the refer-
ence was the English common law "so far as that law was 'applicable to American con-
ditions'." Id. at 623.
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of the United States."0' 5 Under Crosskey's theory the grant of jurisdiction
over controversies between citizens of different states was designed only to
provide an impartial forum for the rare case involving "strictly local laws."00
Accepting this view, it becomes difficult to understand why these grants were
the subject of extensive discussion during the ratification debates. 7 Second,
Crosskey's theory assumes that the English common law was observed through-
out the United States in 1787 as a single body of common law which could
be incorporated into the phrase "laws of the United States" in Article III.
There is strong evidence, however, that after the Declaration of Independence
no single body of general common law existed in the United States but in-
stead, there had developed thirteen separate systems of common law.08
After the Declaration of Independence the only existing common law which
was uniformly observed throughout the nation and which could be incorporated
into the Constitution was that dealing with the relationship between the thir-
teen sovereign states - the law- of nations - for it was the only law observed
in common by each of these sovereigns. 0 Crosskey himself makes this clear
by quoting from Edmund Randolph, an active participant in the drafting
of Article 1II,70 to the effect that the common law was made part of "the laws
of the United States" by the Constitution.7 Yet, Crosskey states, Randolph
was not aware of the "obvious" corollary of this proposition which would
give federal courts jurisdiction over all general common law cases.72 But
Randolph was not as obtuse as Crosskey believes, for Randolph did not con-
ceive that the national common law was a general common law but rather
that "the national common law [was] .. .the law of nations." 3 This law of
nations referred not only to public international law, but also to private in-
ternational law, as well as to all other legal interactions between sovereigns. 4
65. Professor Crosskey admits his interpretation of "laws" would give federal
courts jurisdiction over all cases of general common law. Cpossxzv, op. cit. supra note
54, at 640.
66. The phrase is Crosskey's. Id. at 641. The content of the phrase seems to relate
to state statutes and constitutions and "uncommon state common law." Id. at 647.
67. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAav. L. Rnv. 483,
487-92 (1928). It would also be difficult to understand why the first Congress gave
federal courts original jurisdiction in diversity cases but not in cases involving federal
questions. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System. 13 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 3, 28 (1948).
68. For an excellent summary of this evidence, see Goebel, Ex Parte. Clio, 54 CoLxn..
L. REv. 450, 459-67 (1954).
69. Id. at 469.
70. See WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTIoN 327-31 (1928) for a brief
summary of Randolph's participation in the early stages of drafting of Article III.
71. Caossi, y, op. cit. supra note 54, at 626-27.
72. Id. at 629.
73. Id. at 630.
74. Id. at 570. Crosskey's inclusion of general commercial law within the law of
nations is probably unjustified. See Goebel, supra note 68, at 456-59.
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It is hardly surpising- that "laws of theUnited States" shoud have included
the law of nations. Sifce in*1787 a violation ofthe law of nations was a justified
cause of warTh it would be consistent with; and indeed demanded by, the pur-
poses of union to include such law within federal jurisdiction.O Charles Pinck-
ney's proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation which would have
created federal appellate jurisdiction over cases "on the law of nations" arising
in state courts reflected this understandingY7 And James Wilson, an important
influence on the shape of Article III' expected national courts to enforce
state court observance of the law of nations.?9 Moreover, at least two writers
of The Federalist agreed with Wilson. In Number 3, John Jay commended
the Constitution for committing questions of "treaties, as well as the law of
nati6fis" to- federal jurisdiction80 Although he did not state the source of this
jurisdiction, a charge which he later made to a jury may be explanatory:
The objects of your inquiry are all offen~es committed against the laws
of the United States . . . [and] . .. you will recollect that the laws of
nations make part of the laws of the Nation.81 .
Hamilton, concerned with the parochialism and prejudice state courts might
show in cases of foreign, rdations,82 approved in Number 80 the grant of
federal jurisdiction in "cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations"
as well as those that involve foreigners but "stand merely on the footing of
the municipal law."83 Here Hamilton appears to have distinguished between
federal question and diversity jurisdiction, placing cases involving treaties
and the law of nations in the former category and those involving only municipal
law in the latter. Since he considered federal Eourts to have jurisdiction over
cases involving the law of nations independent of diversity of citizenship, it
can only be assumed he found the source of this jurisdiction in the phrase
"laws of the United States" where. his co-author Jay apparently found it.
Not only was the understanding of "laws" as including the law of nations
frequently'voic'ed, bdt it was also acted upon by the members of the first
Congress. In section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 8 federal courts were
given original jurisdiction "where an alien sues for a tort only in violation
75. THE FDm;isT 63 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Jay) [hereafter cited a; FEnA=u)sT];
2 CRossxEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNsTrrurtox 1347 n.7 (1953).
76. The first two purposes of union listed by Madison -were security against foreign
danger and regulation of intercourse with foreign nations. FmDmRAsT 319.
77. WAmzux, op. cit. upra note 70, at 329 n.1 -
78. Id. at 535 n,2.
79. CRossu-?, op. cit. supra note 54, at 651-52.
80. Fmmawsr 62. "
81. 1 W uRRnx, THE SuPRE1mE COURT mx UNnmm STATEs His oY 112 n.1 (1932).
For'a later statement to the same effect,' see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law").
82. FEERAn sT 192. -
83. Id. at 589.
-- 84. 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789).
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of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."5 This section was
not based upon diversity jurisdiction, since Section 11 8 created jurisdiction
in cases in which a foreigner "is a party." Accordingly the constitutionality
of section 9 depends upon the existence of a law of nations jurisdiction, in-
dependent of diversity. Because this jurisdiction was created by a Congress
many of whose members participated in drafting or ratifying the Constitution
it is strong evidence of the intended meaning of Article III.s In addition
section 9 has been law since 1789 and, while only rarely invoked, it has
been used without constitutional challenge as the basis of federal jurisdiction
where the required diversity of parties has not existed.8
In light of this evidence, it would appear reasonable to conclude that the
framers intended the phrase "laws of the United States" in Article III to
comprehend statutes and at least part of the common law - the law of
nations. Thus federal courts possess the substantive power to make law in
this area, since the framers considered power to make law coextensive with
their grant of jurisdiction. When viewed in this context, the decision in
Sabbatino to create a federal law of foreign relations and to impose it on
the states is within the Court's constitutional power.80 This interpretation
of "laws" would, however, provide for little further expansion of federal
common lawY0 A Court concerned with meeting new national problems would
85. Id. at 77. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the statute in its present form.
86 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
87. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884), for the
weight to be accorded the contemporary construction of the Constitution by the first
Congress. See also Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLIUM. L.
REv. 489, 501 (1954) (the Judiciary Act of 1789 is a good index of the consensus of
1787). But cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), declaring Section 13
of the Act, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789), unconstitutional.
88. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (suit by
an alien plaintiff against alien and citizen defendants). In such a suit diversity jurisdiction
could not be sustained. Tsitsinakis v. Simpson, Spence & Young, 90 F. Supp. 578, 579
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
For a discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the cases which have invoked it, see Note,
56 Am. J. INT'L LAW 552 (1962).
89. While the Court has ruled that the act of state doctrine is not a principle of
international law (376 U.S. at 421) this would not preclude it from being a doctrle
of the law of nations, as that term was used in the eighteenth century, since that law
referred to more than just international law. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
The Court's reference to a principle of conflict of laws - the refusal of one country to
enforce the penal laws of another (376 U.S. at 421) - may indicate its conception of
the basis of the act of state doctrine. And see Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. (N.Y.) 596, 599
(Sup. Ct 1876).
90. Of course, under this interpretation federal common law could be developed In
all fields comprehended by the law of nations. One of these fields would be conflict of
laws. See note 74 supra and accompanying text. As a result, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) - holding a federal court must under Erie employ the
conflicts law of the state in which it sits - could be overruled. Cf. Baxter, Choice of Law
and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963) ; Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts, 55 YALE L.. 267, 286-87 (1946).
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find its law-making powers substantially limited by importing into Article III
only this limited reference to the law of nations. However, no compelling
evidence exists that the law of nations was the only common law meant to
be incorporated within the "laws of the United States ;" the law of nations
may be merely illustrative of the classes of common law committed to federal
jurisdiction and, pro tanto, subject to creation by the federal judiciary. More-
over, an organic theory of the Constitution - one that views it as a living
document which must grow to meet current needs - could properly treat
the reference to the law of nations as illustrative rather than limiting. Under
this view it is the policies embodied in the Constitution which remain im-
mutable rather than the particular manifestations which these policies assumed
when the Constitution was framed."' The policies underlying law of nations
jurisdiction are clear; the law of nations was incorporated into Article III
because it was an area of law in which there was an important national
interest - the peace and perhaps the very existence of the nation - depended
upon its observance.9 2 There may be other areas of law that today affect
important national interests and that should be similarly incorporated into
Article IIL. These areas, if they exist, must he found in the Constitution, its
delineation of federal concerns and the laws made pursuant to it. This is
precisely the approach adopted by the Court in Erie; and finding no basis in
the Constitution for a general common law of torts, this law was struck down.03
The Court's creation of common law in Sabbatino was based upon a similar
process; the Court found in constitutional and statutory provisions the evi-
dence of a strong national interest that justified the making of federal law.
Thus, Erie and Sabbatino are based upon the common understanding that the
power of federal courts to make common law must be determined by reference
to the Constitution.9
91. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). For a forceful statement of an
organic theory of the Constitution, see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 315-17 (1964)
(concurring opinion). For an opposite theory, see id. at 342 (dissent).
92. See notes 75 & 76 supra and accompanying text.
93. 304 U.S. at 78.
94. Not every reference to the Constitution will allow the making of common law,
for not every subject included therein will be of important national interest. With this
in mind, the overruling of Baltimore & 0. R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), by Erie
can be reconciled with the theory of common law used in Sabbalino. The Court in Bough
referred to the Constitution and found a national interest in interstate commerce before
deciding not to apply state law. Id. at 378-79. The particular interest involved in the
case was not, however, an important national interest - torts along insterstate railroads
hardly being as important to the nation as foreign relations. Thus Baugh's creation of
federal common law in the absence of an important national interest was properly
overruled. See note 35 supra.
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